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Standing in Environmental Citizen Suits: Laidlaw's Clarification
of the Injury-in-Fact and Redressability Requirements
by Michael P. Healy
Inits first week of business during the new millennium,the U.S. Supreme Court decided Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. ,I and
provided important clarifications about the law of standing
in environmental citizen suits.' Specifically, the Court re-
jected the narrow view of environmental injury-in-fact ad-
vocated by Justice Scalia and instead adhered to the broader
view of injury-in-fact established in a nonenvironmental
context by the Court's decision in Federal Elections Com-
mission v. Akins.' As importantly, the Court also addressed
the redressability requirement of Article ill standing in
Laidlaw. Here too, the Court did not apply the narrow view
of redressability that Justice Scalia had defined for the Court
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,' and in-
stead found that the deterrence afforded by civil penalties
was sufficient redress for environmental injury-in-fact.
This Article will analyze the Court's quite generous view
of citizen suit standing in Laidlaw. After presenting the legal
background to the Laidlaw decision in the first part of this
Article, I will tum to an analysis of the Court's holdings in
Laidlaw. To be sure, the Court's decision was adumbrated
in important ways by the Court's broader conception of
standing articulated in Akins. Nevertheless, the decision will
be welcomed by environmentalists who had been con-
cerned, viewing the apparent "slash and bum" assault on en-
vironmental standing' in Steel Co. and Defenders of Wildlife
v. Lujan,' that the Court was ready to foreclose citizen suits
when the defendant was unable to demonstrate that the stat-
utory violations giving rise to the suit would recur causing
measurable harm.'
Professor of Law. University of Kentucky College of Law. I wish to thank
my colleague. John Rogers, for discussing the subject of this Article with
me and for providing very helpful comments on a previous draft. Any er-
rors are my own.
1. 120 S. Ct. 693, 30 ELR 20246 (2000).
2. Several members of the Fourth Circuit would disagree with the state-
ment that Laidlaw merely clarified standing law. See Friends of the
Earth v,Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 164, 30 ELR
20369,20375 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (Niemeyer, J., concurring)
("the decision in Laidlaw represents a sea change in constitutional
standing principles"); ill. at 165, 30 ELR at 20375 (Luttig, J., concur-
ring) (a "significant change in environmental standing doctrine [is]
worked by" Laidlaw); id. (Hamilton, J., concurring) (Laidlaw "has
unnecessarily opened the standing floodgates").
3. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
4. 523 U.S. 83, 28 ELR 20434 (1998).
5. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 606, 22 ELR 20913,
20927 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on
what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of en-
vironmental standing.").
6.Id.
7. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria & Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing,
ENVTL.F., July/Aug. 1999, at 20, 21 ("Beneath the cumulative
weight of a serres of recent Supreme Court decisions, citizen stand-
Factual and Legal Background
The Court's Conception of Environmental Citizen Suits
Before turning to a summary of standing law prior to
Laidlaw, the standing issue needs to be framed by an appre-
ciation of the environmental citizen suit context in which it
arises. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation,' the Court considered the scope of the citizen
suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CW A).' The Court
concluded that Congress intended the provision to be for-
ward looking; that is, a citizen suit claim cannot be based on
a violation that has completely ceased at the time that the
complaint is filed. In Gwaltney, both lower courts had held
that a citizen suit could be brought under the CW A based on
violations that were wholly past.'? The Court rejected this
interpretation, holding that the Act requires a claimant to
make a good-faith allegation that the defendant is in viola-
tion of the Act at the time that the claim is filed. I I
The Court decided, based on "the language and structure"
of the citizen suit provision, that the Act foreclosed claims
based on wholly past violations." The Court concluded,
moreover, that allowing claims to be based on wholly past
violations would be inconsistent with the "supplementary
role" that Congress intended citizen suits would play in the
enforcement of the Act, and "would change the nature of the
citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intruslve.?"
The Gwaltney Court also addressed the relation between
mootness and standing in response to the defendant's con-
tention that the Act had to be construed to require "ongoing
noncompliance" during the action to prevent evasion of the
ing is rapidly eroding."). But see id. at 22 (''The Court's decision to
review this ruling [by the court of appeals in Laidlaw] may be a sig-
nal of the justices' willingness to halt, or even possibly reverse, the
loss of ground.").
8. 484 U.S. 49,18 ELR 20142 (1987).
9. 33 U.S.c. §1365(a), ELR STAT.FWPCA §505(a).
10. See 484 U.S. at 55, 56, 18 ELR at 20143.
11. See id. at 64-65, 18 ELR at 20146. The Court was insistent that the
good-faith allegation of a present violation was what the Act re-
quired: ''The statute does not require that a defendant 'be in viola-
tion' of the Act at the commencement of suit; rather, the statute re-
quires that a defendant be 'alleged to be in violation.'''ld. at 64,18
ELR at 20146. Justice Scalia, concurring along with Justices Stevens
and O'Connor, rejected this interpretation, concluding instead that:
[T]he issue to be resolved by the Court of Appeals on remand
of this suit is not whether the allegation of a continuing viola-
tion on the day suit was brought was made in good faith after
reasonable inquiry, but whether the petitioner was in fact "in
violation" on the date suit was brought.
Id. at 69, 18 ELR at 20147.
12. Id. at 59, 18 ELR at 20145.
13. /d. at 60-61, 18 ELR at 20145.
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"case or controversy" requirement of Article Ill," an issue
also considered in Laidlaw. I' The Court rejected this con-
cern, stating that a live controversy is only mooted by the de-
fendant's compliance upon defendant's showing "that it is
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur.t'"
In sum, the CW A requires that a defendant be in violation
at the time the complaint is filed. Once that requirement is
met, the defendant must meet a very high standard to dem-
onstrate that, because the violations will not recur, the con-
troversy is no longer live.
The Court's Conception of Article III Standing
Having established the forward-looking nature of the envi-
ronmental citizen suit, we tum to a summary of how the
Court viewed Article III standing in environmental cases
prior to Laidlaw. It is now well established that a "triad ofin-
jury in fact, causation, and redressability comprises the core
of Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement, and the
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of es-
tablishing its existence.':" This summary will consider two
of these requirements, injury-in-fact and redressability, be-
14. [d. at 66, t8 ELR at 20147.
15. Laidlaw's analysis of mootness is discussed infra.
16. 484 U.S. at 66-67, 18 ELR at 20147 (citations, internal quotations
and footnote omitted).
Gwaltney's interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit provision
did not tum on the Court's view of the scope of Article III standing.
Justice Scalia, who concurred in Gwaltney in an opinion joined by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, addressed standing, however. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that, to ensure that the plaintiff had Article m
standing, the Court should require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant was "in violation" at the time the citizen suit was filed,
rather than require only a good- faith allegation of a present violation.
See 484U.S. at 70-71, 18ELR at 20147(Scalia,J., concurring).In
later citizen suit standing cases, Justices disagreeing with the ap-
proach of the Court majority have made arguments analogous to the
argument presented in Justice Scalia's Gwaltney concurrence. In-
deed, Justices Scalia and Stevens, on opposite sides of the constitu-
tional issue in later cases, have argued that the Court should interpret
citizen suit provisions narrowly to avoid having to address the con-
stitutional question of Article ill standing. Compare Steel Co. v. Cit-
izens foraBetterBnv't, 523U.S. 83, 132-33,28ELR20434,20444
(1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Even if Congress did not intend to
confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, the
Court's "settled policy of adopting acceptable constructions of statu-
tory provisions in order to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of
constitutional questions-here, the unresolved standing ques-
tion-strongly supports a construction of the statute that does not au-
thorize suits for wholly past violations.") with Federal Elections
Comm'n v.Akins,524U.S. 11,32 (1998)(Scalia,J.,di,seoting) ("a
narrower reading of 'party aggrieved' [in the text of the Federal
Election Campaign Act citizen-suit provision] is supported by the
doctrine of constitutional doubt, which counsels us to interpret stat-
utes, if possible, in such fashion as to avoid grave constitutional
questions.") (citation omitted). Cf Defenders of Wildlife v, Lujan,
504U.S. 555, 585,22 ELR20913,20922 (1992)(Stevens,J., con-
curring) ("Although I believe that respondents have standing, Inev-
ertheless concur in the judgment of reversal because] am persuaded
that the Government is correct in its submission that §7(a)(2) does
not apply to activities in foreign countries.").
The debate between Justices Scalia and Stevens in these cases has
the effect of transfonning the old saw, when you don't have the facts
argue the law, into ''when you can't win the constitutional debate ar-
gue statutory construction." Justice Scalia interestingly brands this
approach by Justice Stevens in Steel Co. as "ultra vires," 523 U.S. at
102,28 ELR at 20437, based on his view that the Court is duty bound
to decide whether there is standing before it has the judicial power to
interpret the scope of the statute's citizen suit provision. See id. at
101-02,28 ELR at 20437.
17. Ste.l c«, 523U.S. at 103-04,28ELRat 20438 (footnoteand cita-
tion omitted).
cause the Court has focused on them in its more recent
standing cases, particularly its environmental cases.
The Injury-in-Fact Requirement
To define the injury-in-fact requirement in the context of en-
vironmental citizen suits, two different issues have been the
focus of Court analysis. First, the Court has focused on the
type of environmental impact that may constitute an injury
for purposes of the Article III injury-in-fact requirement.
Second, the Court has addressed the class of claimants that
may properly claim an injury-in-fact. Informing the Court's
approach to both of these issues has been a long-standing
concern that a litigant should not be able to establish an in-
jury-in-fact based on a generalized grievance. The follow-
ing summary of the state of the law relating to both in-
jury-in-fact issues, as well as the Court's concerns about
generalized grievances, provides background for an under-
standing of the siguificance of Laidlaw.
o The Broad Range of Cognizable Environmental Injuries.
In its important early environmental standing case, Sierra
Club v.Morton." the Court viewed broadly the range of im-
pacts to the environment that would give rise to an in-
jury-in-fact for purposes of Article III:
The injury alleged by the Sierra Club will be incurred
entirely by reason of the change in the uses to which
Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in the
aesthetics and ecology of the area. Thus, in referring to
the road to be built through Sequoia National Park, the
complaint alleged that the development "would destroy
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and
historic objects and wildlife of the park and would im-
pair the enjoyment of the park for future generations."
We do not question that this type of harm may amount to
an "injury in fact" sufficient to lay the basis for standing
under § 10 of the APA. Aesthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important in-
gredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact
that particular environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them less de-
serving oflegal protection through the judicial process."
Later in the opiuion, the Court reiterated both compo-
nents of its broad view of cognizable injuries: they "may re-
flect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well as
economic values," and they may be "widely shared.?"
The Court's broad recognition of the status of environ-
mental injuries as coguizable under Article III was consis-
tently reiterated in cases decided after Sierra Club.21 Indeed,
the Court's broad acceptance of environmental injury as in-
jury-in-fact can be seen in the Court's recent acceptance, in
its "slash and bum" standing decision in Defenders of Wild-
life,22of the proposition that "the desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeni-
t8. 405 U.S. 727, 2 ELR 20192 (1972).
19. Id. at 734, 2 ELR at 20194.
20. Id. at738,2 ELRat 20195(internalquotationsandcitationomitted).
21. See. e.g .. Lujan v. NationalWildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 87t, 886, 20
ELR 20962, (1990) (expressing "no doubt" that among interests stat-
utes protected were "'recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment"');
United States v. StudentsChallengingRegulatoryAgency Proce-
dure' (SCRAP),412 U.S. 669. 3 ELR 20536 (1973).
22. See Defendersof Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 22 ELR 20913
(1992).
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ably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing."" In sum,
the Court has consistently viewed a broad range of environ-
mental impacts as constituting injury-in-fact for purposes of
Article III.
The Court interestingly had no occasion in these cases to
identify the existence of any clear limits on the types of envi-
ronmental injuries that are cognizable under Article III.This
is because, as will soon be discussed," all but one of these
cases resulted in decisions that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing, not because the injuries they sought to protect were in-
adequate, but because the plaintiffs adduced insufficient
proof that they had an actual interest in the environmental
amenity or resource being affected. The one exception,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP)," also did not result in the Court's ar-
ticulation of limits, because the standing issue was resolved
on the pleadings and the plaintiff had alleged that cogniza-
ble interests would be affected by the claimed illegality.
Moreover, the Court was not concerned in these cases
about relating the injury claimed by the plaintiffs to the
statutory schemes that gave rise to the claims of illegality. 26
The Court may have seen no need for such an analysis both
because the types of harms being claimed by the plaintiffs
appeared to be traditional sorts of injuries even in the ab-
sence of statutory protection, and because the Court
viewed it as plain that the statutes at issue were protecting
these sorts of interests." In the Court's recent decision in
Akins," however, the Court gave specific attention to the
relationship between a congressionally defined injury and
the Article III requirement of injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs in
that case brought a citizen suit, alleging that the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) violated the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) when it declined to find
that a political action committee, the American Israel Po-
litical Affairs Committee (AIPAC), had violated FECA
and refused to order that grouPs to comply with FECA's
public reporting requirements. 9
23. ld. at 562·63,22ELRat 209t6 (citationontitted).TheCourthas
held, moreover, that when established, environmental injuries are
commonly irreparable. See Amoco Prod, Co. v. Village of
Gamhell,480US. 53l, 17ELR20574(1987),TheCourtdidnot
reach the issue of environmental injury-in-fact in Steel Co. v Citi-
zensfor a BetterEnv't,523U.S, 83, 105,28ELR20434,20439
(1998).
24. See the discussion infra.
25. 412U,S, 669,689,3 ELR20536,20540(1973):("[W]edealhere
simply with the pleadings in which the [plaintiffs] alleged a specific
and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens
who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be af-
fected.") (footnote omitted).
26. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.I.
221, 260 (1988) ("the Court did not engage in serious statutory anal-
ysis in" either Sierra Club or SCRAP).
27. The Court's lack of concern in these environmental cases may be
contrasted with its statutory analysis in Hardin v, Kentucky Util-
ities Co., 390 U.S. I (1968). There. the Court stated that injuries re-
sulting from competition would not generally "confer standing on
the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its
competitor's operations." Id. at 6 (citations omitted). The Court
concluded that prudential standing was present "when the particu-
lar statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to
protect a competitive interest." Id. In that circumstance, "the in-
jured competitor has standing to require compliance with that pro-
vision." Id. (citation omitted).
28, 524U,S. 11 (1998)(Breyer,J.).
29. See id. at 14-16,
The Court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a cog-
nizable Article III injury, given the purpose of the statutory
scheme enacted by Congress:
The "injury in fact" that respondents have suffered con-
sists of their inability to obtain infonnation-lists of
AIPACdonors ... and campaign-relatedcontributions
and expenditures-that, on respondents' view of the
law, the statuterequiresthatAIPACmakepublic.There
is no reason to doubt their claim that the information
wouldhelp them (andothers to whomthey wouldcom-
municate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, es-
pecially candidates who received assistance from
AIPAC,and to evaluatethe role thatAIPAC's financial
assistance might play in a specific election. Respon-
dents' injury consequently seems concrete and particu-
lar. Indeed,thisCourthas previouslyheld thataplaintiff
suffersan "injury in fact" when the plaintiff fails to ob-
tain information whichmust be publiclydisclosedpur-
suant to a statute."
Notwithstanding the fact that the injury in Akins was ef-
fectively defined by the nature of the statute's requirements
of reporting and disclosure, the Court held that Congress
had not exceeded its constitutional power as limited by Arti-
cle III, because the statutorily defined injury met Article
Ill's particularity requirement: "The informational injury at
issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of politi-
cal rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the
fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of
constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the fed-
eral courts. "31
In short, the Court has accepted in environmental cases
that a broad range of environmental impacts constitute cog-
nizable injuries under Article III. Outside of the environ-
mental context, the Court has indicated a willingness to take
the lead from Congress in accepting as cognizable under Ar-
ticle III injuries that are defined by statute."
o Proper Parties for Asserting a Claim of Injury .Notwith-
standing the Court's acceptance of environmental injuries
as injuries-in-fact under Article III, some of the Court's
most prominent modem standing cases have held that plain-
tiffs claiming enviromnental injuries resulting from statu-
tory violations failed to meet the injury-in-fact requirement.
Indeed, what the Court gave in Sierra Club, when it cata-
logued the broad range of enviromnental injuries cogniza-
ble under Article III, it largely withdrew by circumscribing
the parties who could assert those interests." The Court spe-
cifically distinguished between the requirement of a cogni-
zable injury and the requirement of actual injury, stating that
"broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning
30. !d. at 21 (citation omitted).
31. ld. at 24·25,
32. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 253 ("when the Court has decided ac-
tual cases involving statutory rights, it has never required any show-
ing of injury beyond that set out in the statute itself."). Because the
Court inAkins held that the injury asserted was cognizable under Ar-
ticle III because it was concrete, it did not go as far as to accept Judge
Fletcher's opinion that "[w]hen Congress passes a statute conferring
a legal right on a plaintiff to enforce a statutorily created duty, the
Court should not require that the plaintiff show 'injury in fact' over
and above the violation of the statutorily conferred right." ld.
33. See 405 U.S. at 734-35,2 ELR at 20194 ("the 'injury in fact' test re-
quires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among the injured.").
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the requirement that the party seeking review must himself
have suffered an injury."" The Sierra Club's complaint
failed with regard to this latter requirement:
The impact of the proposed changes in the environ-
ment of Mineral King will not fall indiscriminately upon
every citizen. The alleged injury will be felt directly only
by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia National
Park, and for whom the aesthetic and recreational values
of the area will be lessened by the highway and ski resort.
The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members
would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by
the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or
affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral
King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any
way that would be significantly affected by the proposed
actions of the respondents."
The Court believed that this "requirement that a party
seeking review must allege facts showing that he is him-
self adversely affected ... does serve as at least a rough
attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be
sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in
the outcome. "36
In two more recent decisions, the Court relied upon this
personal effect requirement to hold that environmental
claimants had failed to establish an injury-in-fact. In
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation," the Court held
that the plaintiff had failed to establish an injury-in-fact,
where its proof of injury was affidavits of members who
stated that they used and enjoyed federal lands "in the vi-
cinity of' lands to be affected by the challenged govern-
ment action."
Similarly, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate an injury-in-factin Lujan v.Defenders of Wild-
life." Although the Court accepted that the underlying inju-
ries would, if proved, constitute Article ill injuries," it con-
cluded that
To survive the Secretary's summary judgment motion,
respondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence
showing, through specific facts, not only that listed spe-
cies were in fact being threatened by funded activities
abroad, but also that one or more of respondents' mem-
bers would thereby be "directly" affected apart from
their "special interest" in th[e] subject."
The Court concluded that this direct effects test had not been
met in the circumstances of the case, because the affidavits
supporting the plaintiffs claim for standing stated only that
the affiants had plans to return "some day" to the foreign na-
tions where the animals of interest to those members lived
34. Id. at 738, 2 ELR at 20195.
35. Id. at 735, 2 ELR at 20194 (footnoteomitted).
36. Id. at 740,2 ELR at 20195-96.
37. 497 U.S. 871, 20 ELR 20962 (1990).
38. See id. at 886, 20 ELR at 20964. See also id. at 889, 20 ELR at
20966 (the standing requirement is not met "by averments which
state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified por-
tions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which
mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the
governmental action.").
39. 504 U.S. 555, 22 ELR 20913 (1992).
40. See Federal Elections Conun'n v, Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
41. 504 U.S. at 563,22 ELR at 20916 (citation and internal quota-
tions omitted).
and any injury was accordingly not imminent": "Such
'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or immi-
nent' injury that our cases require."" The Court stated that
the purpose of a requirement of imminence "is to insure that
the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article illpur-
poses .... "44The claimed injury was, in the Court's view, too
speculative because "the plaintiff alleges only an injury at
some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make
the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiffs
own control.?" In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
clarified why he had concluded that the plaintiffs' claimed
injuries were too speculative in this case:
While it may seem trivial to require that Mss. Kelly
and Skilbred acquire airlitte tickets to the project sites or
announce a date certain upon which they will return, this
is not a case where it is reasonable to assume that the
affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis, nor do
the affiants claim to have visited the sites since the pro-
jects commenced.f
The Defenders of Wildlife Court also addressed the plain-
tiffs' claim that they suffered injury-in-fact because they
were interested in the study and protection of an ecosystem
that is part of an interconnected global ecosystem, so that
harms to species in a foreign locale by the challenged gov-
ernment action also harm the rest of the ecosystem in which
plaintiffs claim an interest. The Court rejected this claim of
an injury, because the plaintiffs had failed to meet the per-
ceptible effect requirement: "To say that the Act protects
ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were pos-
sible) rights of action in persons who have not been in-
jured-in-fact, that is, persons who use portions of an eco-
system not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in
question."? Given how remote the plaintiffs were from the
place where the animal species of concern to them were ar-
guably being harmed, the plaintiffs could show no such
perceptible effect:
It is clear that the person who observes or works with a
particular animal threatened by a federal decision is fac-
ing perceptible harm, since the very subject of his inter-
est will no longer exist. It is even plausible-though it
goes to the outermost limit of plausibility-to think that
42. The Court focused its concern about the showing of a direct injury
on whether the affiants would personally experience the reduced
numbers of animals, rather than whether that reduction would actu-
ally occur:
We shall assume for the sake of argument that these affida-
vits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded projects
threaten listed species-though that is questionable. They
plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the
species will produce "imminent" injury to [the affiants].
/d.
43. Id. at 564, 22 ELR at 20916 (citationomitted).
44. Id. at 564 n.2, 22 ELR at 20916 n.2.
45.Id.
46. Id. at 579, 22 ELR at 20920 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens re-
jected this concern, concluding that the affiants' interests and previ-
ous visits to view the species at issue were sufficient to establish im-
minence. See id. at 584 n.2, 22 ELR at 20921 n.2 (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("[R]espondents would not be injured by the challenged
projects if they had not visited the sites or studied the threatened spe-
cies and habitat. But, ... respondents did visit the sites; moreover,
they have expressed an intent to do so again.").
47. Id. at 566, 22 ELR at 20917.
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a person who observes or works with animals of a partic-
ular species in the very area of the world where that spe-
cies is threatened by a federal decision is facing such
harm, since someanimalsthatmighthavebeen the sub-
ject ofhis interestwillno longerexist.Itgoesbeyondthe
limit,however,andintopure speculationandfantasy,to
say that anyone who observes or works with an endan-
gered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably
harmedbya singleprojectaffectingsomeportionof that
species with which he has no more specific connection."
In sum, although the Court has concluded that a broad
range of environmental impacts may give rise to an Article
ill injury-in-fact, the Court has sought to ensure that the par-
ticular plaintiff claiming an injury from such an impact will
be imminently affected in a perceptible way.
o Generalized Grievances. The purpose of the Court's re-
quirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that they will suffer an
actual injury-in-fact is to foreclose the judiciary from being
used by claimants "to do no more than vindicate their own
value preferences."" This bar against the judicial resolution
of generalized grievances'? was applied in the first great en-
vironmental standing case, Sierra cus» to reject the Sierra
Club's effort to establish standing doctrine that would per-
mit that organization to bring a public action"
More recently, the bar against the litigation of generalized
grievances has been debated by the Court when it has re-
solved standing issues in environmental and
nonenvironmental contexts. The opposing sides of the de-
bate about the scope of the generalized grievances bar have a
sharp fundamental disagreement about the types of injuries
that give rise to injury-in-fact, Although the views of Justice
Scalia, who wrote for the majority in Defenders of Wildlife
and advocates a broad scope to the generalized grievance
bar, appeared to be prevailing in the early 1990s, the views
of Justice Breyer, who wrote for the majority in Akins and
views the bar more narrowly, have more recently driven the
Court's approach to this issue.
In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court's consideration of the
generalized grievance bar arose in the context of the lower
court's view that "the injury-in-fact requirement had been
satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an
abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law."" Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected this view, finding
that a plaintiff could bring suit based on the government's
failure to conform to procedures mandated by statute only
when the failure to comply with the required procedures re-
sulted in direct and tangible injury.54The Court grounded
48. [d. at 566-67, 22 ELR at 20917 (citation and footnote omitted).
49. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740, 2 ELR 20192, 20196
(1972).
50. The Court often contrasts the noncognizable generalized grievance
with particularized injury. See Defenders of Wild life, 504 U.S. at 560
n.I, 22 ELR at 20915 n. I ("By particularized, we mean that the in-
jury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.").
51. 405 U.S. at 727,2 ELR at 20192.
52. [d. at 736, 2 ELR at 20194.
53. 504 U.S. at 573, 22 ELR at 20918.
54. [d. at 573-74, 22 ELR at 20919:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about govemment--claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper applica-
tion of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
this requirement in separation-of-powers limits on the judi-
ciary that translate into limits on Congress' power to define
cognizable injury:
Thequestionpresentedhere is whetherthe public inter-
est in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in
agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily pre-
scribed procedure) can be converted into an individual
right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that
permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citi-
zens who suffer no distinctive concrete hann) to sue. If
the concrete injury requirement has the separa-
tion-of-powers significance we have always said, the an-
swer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers'
compliancewiththe lawintoan"individualright"vindi-
cable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the
Lawsbe faithfullyexecuted,"Art. Il, § 3."
Justice Scalia's broad view of the generalized grievance
bar shaped his reading for the Court majority of the Court's
previous decision in United States v. Richardson" and what
he viewed as the broad precedential value of that case. In
Richardson, the Court decided that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate standing in a suit claiming that the govern-
ment's failure to disclose expenditures of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency violated the statement and account clause of
the U.S. Constitution." In Defenders of Wildlife, Justice
Scalia read Richardson as establishing that standing was
lacking because "such a suit rested upon an impermissible
'generalized grievance,' and was inconsistent with 'the
framework of Article ill' because 'the impact on [plaintiff]
is plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of
the public.:"58
Only six years later, however, Justice Scalia found him-
self in the minority when the Court again addressed the gen-
eralized grievance bar to standing. In Akins," Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, acknowledged that "[tjhe
FEC's strongest argument is its contention that this lawsuit
involves only a 'generalized grievance."'''' The Court then
held that the generalized grievance bar did not apply to inju-
ries that, while widely shared, are "sufficiently concrete and
specific."'l Justice Breyer, on behalf of the Akins majority,
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the pub-
lic at large-does not state an Article Illcase or controversy.
The Court noted that its standing decisions have adhered to arequire-
ment that a plaintiff show personal injury: "The dissent is unable to
cite a single case in which we actually found standing solely on the
basis of a 'procedural right' unconnected to the plaintiff s own con-
crete harm." ld. at 573 0.8, 22 ELR at 20918-19 n.8.
55. 504 U.S. at 567-77, 22 ELR at 20918.
56. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
57. An. 1. §9, cl. 7 ("a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time").
58. 504 U.S. at 579, 22 ELR at 20919 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at
176-77).
59. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
60. [d. at 23.
61. The Court stated that:
[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court
has found injury in fact. Thus the fact that a political forum
may be more readily available where an injury is widely
shared (while counseling against, say, interpreting a statute
as conferring standing) does not, by itself, automatically dis-
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rejected the applicability of Richardson, which had been
cited by neither party. 62 The Court concluded that Con-
gress had established through FECA a concrete right to
particular information viewed by the claimants as impor-
tant to their exercise of the right to vote. It stated that in
Akins, unlike Richardson, "there is a statute which ... does
seek to protect individuals such as respondents from the
kind of harm they say they have suffered, i.e., failing to re-
ceive particular information about campaign-related activ-
ities."" This left Justice Scalia able only to chide the Court
for abandoning Richardson" and to decry the Court's ac-
ceptance of a role for the judiciary defined by Congress
that conflicts descriptively and normatively with the gov-
ernmental structure."
In sum, the Court's approach to injury-in-fact in environ-
mental cases has accepted a broad range of impacts as con-
stitutionally sufficient, while it has sought to ensure that the
claimant is a directly affected party. The Court has recently
been engaged in a spirited and closely divided debate about
whether a claimant who has brought a citizen suit is assert-
ing a generalized grievance that is not a cognizable in-
jury-in-fact.
qualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest,
where sufficiently concrete, may count as an injury in fact.
This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a
hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer
the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort),
or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with vot-
ing rights conferred by law. We conclude that similarly, the
informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting,
the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and
specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not de-
prive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindi-
cation in the federal courts.
ld. at 24·25 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also id. at
23 ("The kind of judicial language to which the FEC points, how-
ever, invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue is not only
widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature-for
example, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to law.'" (ci-
tation omitted)).
62. See id. at 21.
63. ki. at 22 (citation omitted).
64. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that, "[t]airly read, and applying
a fair understanding of its important purposes, Richardson is indis-
tinguishable from the present case." 524 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, 1., dis-
senting). I should note that it is nice to see, if only in this limited con-
text, Justice Scalia taking a purposivist approach to interpretation,
after rejecting such an approach to the interpretation of statutes. See,
e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,417 (1991) (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing) (criticizing the Court's purposivist interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act).
65. See ld. at 36-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
If today's decision is correct, it is within the power of Con-
gress to authorize any interested person to manage (through
the courts) the Executive's enforcement of any law that in-
cludes a requirement for the filing and public availability of a
piece of paper. This is not the system we have had, and is not
the system we should desire.
See also id. at 36 (Scalia, 1., dissenting):
When the Executive can be directed by the courts, at the in-
stance of any voter, to remedy a deprivation which affects the
entire electorate inprecisely the same way-and particularly
when that deprivation (here, the unavailability of informa-
tion) is one inseverable part of a larger enforcement
scheme-s-there has occurred a shift of political responsibility
to a branch designed not to protect the public at large but to
protect individual rights.
The Redressability Requirement
Redressability is the other standing requirement that the
Court has considered recently in the context of environ-
mental citizen suits. In Steel Co. ,66 the plaintiff's citizen
suit claimed that the defendant had violated the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA)" by failing to prepare required reports on its in-
ventory of hazardous substances and release of toxic sub-
stances." After receiving the required notice of the plain-
tiff's planned citizen suit, the defendant issued the re-
quired reports prior to the filing of the complaint." The
Court assumed that the plaintiff had demonstrated in-
jury-in-fact," but held that the plaintifflacked standing be-
cause none of the forms of relief it had sought would re-
dress the injury caused by the defendant's filing of its un-
lawfully late reports."
The fonn of relief that the Court analyzed most closely re-
garding redressability was the plaintiff's request for civil
penalties imposed for statutory violations." Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority relied upon, this time in the
66. 523 U.S. at 83, 28 ELR at 20434.
67.42 U.S.C. §§1l001.11050, ELR STAT.EPCRA §§301-330.
68. 523 U.S. at 87·88, 28 ELR at 20434.
69. [d. at 88, 28 ELR at 20434.
70. /d. at 105, 28 ELR at 20438.
71. The court concluded that:
The complaint asks for (1) a declaratory judgment that peti-
tioner violated EPCRA; (2) authorization to inspect periodi-
cally petitioner's facility and records (with costs borne by pe-
titioner); (3) an order requiring petitioner to provide respon-
dent copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA;
(4) an order requiring petitioner to pay civil penalties of
$25,000 per day for each violation of §§11022and 11023; (5)
an award of all respondent's "costs, in connection with the in-
vestigation and prosecution of this matter, including reason-
able attorney and expert witness fees, as authorized by Sec-
tion 326(f) of [EPCRA]"; and (6) any such further relief as
the court deems appropriate. None of the specific items of re-
lief sought, and none that we can envision as "appropriate"
under the general request, would serve to reimburse respon-
dent for losses caused by the late reporting, or to eliminate
any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.
[d. at 105-06, 28 ELR at 20438 (citation and footnotes omitted).
72. The brevity of the Court's analysis of the lack of redress associated
with the other forms of relief sought by the plaintiff is an indication
of the Court's view of the insufficiency of the claim. The Court
found that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff would be
"worthless" because there was "no controversy over whether peti-
tioner failed to file reports, or over whether such a failure constitutes
a violation .... " Id. at 107,28 ELR at 20438. The Court viewed the
second and third items of relief sought by the plaintiff to be "injunc-
tive in nature." Id. at 108, 28 ELR at 20439. The Court concluded
that, "[i]f respondent had alleged a continuing violation or the immi-
nence of a future violation, the injunctive relief requested would
remedy that alleged harm. But there is no such allegation here--and
on the facts of the case, there seems no basis for it." ld. The Court re-
jected in this context the Solicitor General's argument that future il-
legal activity should be presumed when illegal activity only ceases
in response to litigation. See id. at 109, 28 ELR at 20439. The final
specified form of requested relief was the recovery of the costs oflit-
igation. The Court rejected that form of relief as redress, because "a
plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by
bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit." ld. at 107, 28 ELR at
20438. The plaintiff also sought other unspecified, «appropriate" re-
lief, but the Court concluded that no relief "that we can envision as
<appropriate' under the general request, would serve to reimburse re-
spondent for losses caused by the late reporting, or to eliminate any
effects of that late reporting upon respondent." Id. at 106,28 ELR
at 20438.
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redressability context, the principle that the Constitution
does not permit adjudication based on a generalized
grievance. Because the civil penalties available under
the statute would be paid to the federal government,
rather than to the plaintiff, the Court stated that, "[i]n re-
questing them, ... respondent seeks not remediation of
its own injury-reimbursement for the costs it incurred
as a result of the late filing-but vindication of the rule
of law-the 'undifferentiated public interest' in faithful
execution of EPCRA.""
Although the Court then referred to Justice Stevens' con-
tention that the civil penalties provided by the statute are ad-
equate redress because of their deterrent effect, the Court's
analysis actually rejected only his claim that such penalties
are adequate redress because of the "psychic satisfaction"
they yield:
Justice Stevens thinks it is enough that respondent will
be gratifiedby seeing petitionerpuoishedfor its infrac-
tionsandthat the puoishmentwill detertheriskof future
harm.If thatwereso,our holdingsin Linda R.S. v.Rich-
ard D., and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organi-
zation, are inexplicable. Obviously, such a principle
would make the redressability requirement vaoish. By
the mere briogiog of his suit, every plaintiff demon-
strateshisbeliefthata favorablejudgmentwillmakehim
happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort
andjoy from the fact that the Uoited StatesTreasury is
not cheated, that a wrongdoergets his just deserts [sic],
or thatthe nation's lawsarefaithfullyenforced,thatpsy-
chic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy
because it does not redress a cognizable Article III in-
jury. Relief thatdoesnot remedythe iojurysufferedcan-
notbootstrapaplaintiffiota federalcourt; thatis thevery
essence of the redressability requirement."
As this passage explains, Justice Scalia's redressability
analysis for the majority was dependent on the fact that the
civil penalties available under EPCRA were inadequate re-
dress for past violations because they had to be paid to the
federal government, rather than to the plaintiff. Justice
Scalia therefore acknowledged that the lack of
redressability would be cured if Congress had provided
that part of the penalties, even perhaps a peppercorn, be
paid to the plaintiff for the statutory violations proved in
the case. 75 This concession, which likely reflects the histor-
ical acceptance of qui tam actions, has the effect of recog-
nizing broad congressional authority to define constitu-
tionally adequate redress. Given this acceptance of con-
gressional power by the Steel Co. majority, Justice Scalia's
73. [d. at 107.28ELRat 20438(citationsontitted).
74. Id. at 106-07, 28 ELR at 20438 (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 107, 28 ELR at 20438 ("[T]he civil penalties authorized by
the statute ... might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to
respondent if they were payable to respondent."). Justice Stevens
chided the majority for this view:
Yet it is unclear why the separation of powers question
should tum on whether the plaintiff receives monetary com-
pensation. In either instance, a private citizen is enforcing
the law. If separation of powers does not preclude standing
when Congress creates a legal right that authorizes compen-
sation to the plaintiff, it is unclear why separation of powers
should dictate a contrary result when Congress has created a
legal right but has directed that payment be made to the fed-
eral Treasury.
[d. at 127,28ELRat 20443(Stevens,J" coocurring).
concerns about the impact of broadened citizen suit stand-
ing appear to be nothing more than policy arguments rele-
vant to Congress' decisions about proper redress, rather
than necessary lintitations on citizen litigation mandated
by our constitutional structure."
In sum, the Court's analysis of the redressability require-
ment in the context of environmental citizen suits appeared
to lintit standing because succeeding in having statutory
civil penalties imposed on a violator of environmental laws
was found to be inadequate redress for the plaintiff s
claimed environmental injury.
Laidlaw and Its Impact on Standing inEnvironmental
Citizen Suits
Against this unsettled legal background, the Court has now
decided Laidlaw." Laidlaw operated a point source that had
received a national pollution discharge elimination system
(NPDES) perroit to discharge pollutants into waters of the
United States as required by the CWA78 Laidlaw thereafter
"repeatedly" violated the emissions limitations established
by the permit over an eight-year period." Several of these
violations occurred after the plaintiff had filed the com-
plaint." Laidlaw moved for summary judgment in district
court, contending that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a
cognizable Article III injury-in-fact." Friends of the Earth
responded by subntitting affidavits and depositions of its
members describing their use of and interest in the water-
way receiving Laidlaw's unlawfully high pollutant dis-
charges." "After examining this evidence, the District
Court denied Laidlaw's summary judgment motion, find-
ing-albeit 'by the very slimmest of margins'-that FOE
had standing to bring the suit."!'
76. Cf id. at 127, 28 ELR at 20443 ("[I]n this case (assuming for present
purposes that respondent correctly reads the statute) not only has
Congress authorized standing, but the Executive Branch has also en-
dorsed its interpretation of Article m. It is this Court's decision, not
anything that Congress or the Executive has done, that encroaches
on the domain of other branches of the Federal Government.") (cita-
tion and footnote omitted).
77. 120S.Ct. at 693,30ELRat 20246,
78. See 33U.S.C.§§131l(a),1342(a),ELRSTAT.FWPCA§§301(a),
402(a).
79. See Laidlaw, 120S.Ct.at 701-02,30ELRat 20247:
Once it received its permit, Laidlaw began to discharge
various pollutants into the waterway; repeatedly, Laidlaw's
discharges exceeded the limits set by the pennit.ln particular,
despite experimenting with several technological fixes, Laid-
law consistently failed to meet the permit's stringent 1.3 ppb
(parts per billion) daily average limit on mercury discharges.
The District Court later found that Laidlaw had violated the
mercury limits on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995.
(Citation omitted.)
80. See id. at 702,30ELRat 20247:
The record indicates that after FOE initiated the suit, but be-
fore the District Court rendered judgment, Laidlaw violated
the mercury discharge limitation in its permit 13 times. The
District Court also found that Laidlaw had committed 13
monitoring and 10 reporting violations during this period.
The last recorded mercury discharge violation occurred in
January 1995, long after the complaint was filed but about
two years before judgment was rendered.
(Citations omitted.)
81. [d.
82. Id.
83. [d. (citationontitted).
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In January 1997, the district court entered judgment
against Laidlaw, finding that the defendant had repeatedly
violated its permit limitations, and ordered Laidlaw to pay a
civil penalty of $405,800.84 In setting the penalty at that
level, the district court accounted for the statutory factors,
including the "total deterrent effect?" and its finding that
"there has been 'no demonstrated proof of harm to the envi-
ronment' from Laidlaw's mercury discharge violations.""
In resolving Laidlaw's subsequent appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Steel Co. and "reasoned that the case had become moot
because 'the only remedy currently available to
[FOE]-dvil penalties payable to the government-would
not redress any injury [FOE has] suffered.' The court there-
fore vacated the District Court's order and remanded with
instructions to dismiss the action.':"
Given the defendant's contentions regarding standing
and the decision of the court of appeals, Laidlaw pre-
sented the Court with the opportunity to address both the
injury-in-fact and redressability requirements of Article
III standing.
Injury-in-Fact in Environmental Cases
As decided by the Court, Laidlaw had much to say about the
constitutional sufficiency of an injury premised on adverse
environmental impacts. Laidlaw differed from the earlier
environmental standing cases, in which the Court found no
injury-in-fact, because members of the plaintiff organiza-
tion had identified a desire to use the local resource being
impacted by the allegedly unlawful activity. For example,
the Court referred to statements of one such member in affi-
davits and a deposition that he resided near Laidlaw's facil-
ity and the affected waterway and that he refrained from us-
ing the waterway for recreation "because of his concerns
about Laidlaw's discharges.'?" In the Court's view, the evi-
dence of direct injury to the plaintiff in Laidlaw took the
case wholly out of the improper party category that the
84. Id. at 703,30 ELR at 20247 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 27 ELR 20976 (D.S.C.
1997».
85. Id.
86. u. at 704, 30 ELR at 20247 (quoting 956 F. Supp. at 602, 27 ELR at
20982). The Court also quoted the district court's statement in the
context of determining the civil penalty that "'[t]he NPDES permit
violations at issue in this citizen suit did not result in any health risk
or environmental harm. '" ld. at 704. 30 ELR at 20248.
87. Id. at 703,30 ELR at 20248 (citation ontitted).
88. Id. at 704, 30 ELR at 20248:
[T]he District Court found that FOE had demonstrated suffi-
cient injury to establish standing. For example, FOE member
Kenneth Lee Curtis averred in affidavits that he lived a
half-mile from Laidlaw's facility; that he occasionally drove
over the North Tyger River, and that it looked and smelled
polluted; and that he would like to fish, camp, swim, and pic-
nic in and near the river between 3 and 15 miles downstream
from the facility, as he did when he was a teenager, but would
not do so because he was concerned that the water was pol-
luted by Laidlaw's discharges. Curtis reaffirmed these state-
ments in extensive deposition testimony. For example, he
testified that he would like to fish in the river at a specific spot
he used as a boy, but that he would not do so now because of
his concerns about Laidlaw's discharges.
(Citations omitted.)
Court had framed in National Wildlife Federation and De-
fenders of Wildlife."
The critical injury-in-fact issue resolved in Laidlaw in-
stead concerned the nature of the environmental injuries that
are cognizable under Article m. On this issue, as we dis-
cussed earlier, the Court had consistently stated that degra-
dation of the environment claimed as injurious to a plaintiff
constituted a cognizable Article III injury-in-fact." Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Laidlaw majority, relied on
the watershed decision in Sierra Club to support the conclu-
sion that there was an injury-in-fact: "We have held that en-
vironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when
they aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will
be lessened' by the challenged activity.'?'
The problem for the Laidlaw majority, though, was iden-
tifying how such values of the receiving waterway were
"lessened" given the district court's finding that Laidlaw's
illegal discharges had neither actually harmed nor increased
the risk of harm to the environment." This finding is some-
what surprising, but no doubt attributable to the limited evi-
dence presented by Friends of the Earth in response to the
motion for summary judgment on standing. The plaintiff
was apparently unable to demonstrate that the permit viola-
tions had caused violations of the applicable water quality
standards." More surprising, though, was the plaintiffs ap-
parent failure to claim injury based on the nature of the toxic
effects of the pollutant (mercury) or the increased risk of
89. See id. at 705-06, 30 ELR at 20249, where the Court stated that:
[T]he affidavits and testimony presented by FOE in this case
assert that Laidlaw's discharges, and the affiant members'
reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, di-
rectly affected those affiants' recreational. aesthetic, and eco-
nomic interests. These submissions present dispositively
more than the mere "general averments" and "conclusory al-
legations" found inadequate in National Wildlife Federation.
Nor can the affiants' conditional statements-that they
would use the nearby North Tyger River for recreation if
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into it-be equated
with the speculative "'some day' intentions" to visit endan-
gered species halfway around the world that we held insuffi-
cient to show injury in fact in Defenders of Wildlife.
(Citations omitted.) In this regard, the members of Friends of the
Earth were like the plaintiffs in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc.,478 U.S. 221 (1986), and Robertson v,Methow Val-
ley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). Even Justice Scalia had
not raised any concerns about standing in those cases because of the
plaintiffs' obvious interest in the affected resource. See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 us, 555, 573 n.8, 22 ELR 20913, 20918-19
n.8 (1992). That the Laidlaw Court distinguished Defenders of Wild-
life on this ground makes the earlier decision more "plausible." See
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries, .. and Article JIJ, 91 MtCH. L. REV. 163, 203 (1992) ("if
the outcome in [Defenders of Wildlife ] turns on the fact that plaintiffs
made an inadequate showing that they would indeed return to the rel-
evant sites, the Court's decision is hardly implausible.").
90. See discussion supra.
91. Id. at 705,30 ELR at 20249 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735,2
ELR at 20194).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. See 33 U.S.C. §1313, ELR STAT.FWPCA §303. Cf Friends of the
Earth v, Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 157,30
ELR 20369, 20372 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (in finding in-
jury-in-fact, the court relies on the fact that permit limitations vio-
lated by the defendant were set at a level needed to ensure water
quality standard compliance).
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their occurrence given the unlawfully increased amounts of
the pollutant in the waterway."
The Court found an injury-in-fact in Laidlaw by employ-
ing the analytic method it had utilized in Akins and by rely-
ing on its own long-standing conception of environmental
injury. As we will see, both parts of the Court's analysis
were necessary 10 its conclusion that Friends of the Earth
had identified a cognizable injury-in-fact. First, the Court
proceeded as it had in Akins to follow the lead of Congress in
identifying a cognizable injury-in-fact" and held that
The relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury to
the plaintiff. To insist upon the fonnerrather than the lat-
ter as part of the standing inquiry ... is to raise the stand-
ing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success
on the merits in an action alleging noncompliance with
an NPDES pennit."
The nature of the Court's analysis-both matter-of-fact and
brief-shows the effect that Akins has had in relating statu-
tory violation to injury-in-fact: injury-in-fact was present
because the effect that Congress sought to prevent by its
statutory requirement-increased pollutant levels in a wa-
terway resulting from the defendant's permit viola-
tions-was felt to be injurious to those who wished to use
the affected local resource.
Akins, of course, did not hold that an Article ill in-
jury-in-fact was present simply because the plaintiffs
claimed that they were harmed by the statutory violation.
The Court required that the injury be sufficiently concrete to
be cognizable under Article ill.This leads to the second part
of the Laidlaw Court's analysis in support of its finding of
Article ill injury-in-fact. Here, the Court relied on the con-
ception of environmental injury to which it has consistently
adhered and which resulted in the decision that the injury at
issue in Laidlaw was concrete. At bottom, Laidlaw demon-
strates very nicely that the Court's conception of environ-
mental injury reflects a property-rule, rather than liabil-
ity-rule, paradigm.97 As Judge Calabresi and Mr. Melamed
94. The district court found that '''[t]he NPDES permit violations at is-
sue in this citizen suit did not result in any health risk , ...... 120 S. Ct.
at 704, 30 ELR at 20247 (quoting956 F. Supp. at 602, 27 ELR at
20982). For an example of a case in which the plaintiffs presented
such evidence of increased risks of harm due to increased pollutant
levels, see Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 157,30 ELR at 20372.
The Laidlaw Court's conclusion of an injury-in-fact would have
been less noteworthy if the plaintiffs had adduced evidence about the
increased risk created by increased levels of mercury in the receiving
waters and the Court had found an injury based on that heightened
risk. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 203-04 (arguing that in-
jury-in-fact may be identified based on conduct creating environ-
mental risks); see also Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160, 30 ELR at
20373 ("Threats or increased risk ... constitutes cognizable harm.
Threatened environmental injury is by nature probabilistic."). For a
discussion of "the 'multiple warhead' nature of the Clean Water
Act's approaches to [limiting] toxic pollution," see Oliver A. Houck,
The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21
ELR 10528,10528 (Sept. 1991).
95. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
96. Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704, 30 ELR at 20248.
97. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules. and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For a discussion of an environ-
mental context in which legislatures have differed in their adherence
to a property-rule approach rather than liability-rule approach in de-
fining a regulatory regime, see Michael P. Healy, England's Con-
taminatedLandActof 1995: Perspectives on America's Approach to
Hazardous Substance Cleanups and Evolving Principles of Interna-
tional Law, 13J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL.L. 289,298-99& n.48
describe these two types of rules in their famous article,
when an entitlement is protected by a property rule, its value
is determined by the person who holds the entitlement; that
person will not sell the entitlement unless she receives what
she believes the entitlement is worth." The authors contrast
this regime with a regime that protects an entitlement by a li-
ability rule; under such a regime, the value of the entitle-
ment is "objectively determined" rather than determined by
the owner's subjective valuation."
Laidlaw is exceptionally instructive in this regard, because
the case implicated the issue of injury both at the constitu-
tional threshold of standing and at the later stage of the as-
signment of liability. On the threshold standing issue, the
Court focused on the articulated belief of the members of the
plaintiff organization themselves that the local environment
that they planned to use and enjoy recreationally was being
harmed as a result of the defendant discharging unlawfully
high amounts of pollutants into the resource. For the Court,
the important fact is the objective illegal increase in the level
of pollutants in the waterway: The members' feeling of
aggrievement in response to that illegally high pollution level
is then accepted as "reasonable" by the Court.'?' Although the
Court claimed that it was demanding objectivity ,101 its analy-
sis reflects an unstated vision of environmental injury that ac-
cepts the subjectivity of an individual's response to prohib-
ited environmental impacts. This is the Court's own under-
standing of injury; it does not arise out of the Court's under-
standing of the interests that Congress intended to proteet.102
(1997·1998) (arguing that England's statutory scheme for cleaning
up hazardous substances reflects a liability rule, while the American
federal statutory scheme reflects a property rule).
98. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1092; see also id. at
1106-08.
99. [d. at 1092. See also id. at 1106-08 (describing eminent domain as a
valuation method that relies on a liability rule).
100. See Laidlaw, 120S. Ct. at 706, 30 ELRat 20249,where the Court
stated that:
[I]t is undisputed that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-c-discharg-
ing pollutants in excess of permit limits-was occurring at the
time the complaint was filed. Under Lyons, then, the only "sub-
jective" issue here is "ltlhe reasonableness of [the] fear" that led
the affiants to respond to that concededly ongoing conduct by
refraining from use of the North Tyger River and surrounding
areas. Unlike the dissent, we see nothing "improbable" about
the proposition that a company's continuous and pervasive ille-
gal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause nearby resi-
dents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and would
subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms. The propo-
sition is entirely reasonable, the District Court found it was true
in this case, and that is enough for injury in fact.
(Citation omitted.)
101. See id.
102. The Court's own property-rule paradigm for understanding environ-
mental injury may be contrasted with an argument about environ-
mental injury that Judge Fletcher presented in his well-known article
on standing. See Fletcher, supra note 26. There, Judge Fletcher ar-
gued that the Court properly demanded little proof of the actual
threatened injury in United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 3 ELR 20536
(1973), because the statutory scheme that plaintiffs relied upon for
protection was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42
U.S.c. §§4321-437Od,ELRSTAT. NEPA§§2-209.See Fletcher,su-
pra note 26, at 259·60. Judge Fletcher argued that Congress had en-
acted that statute to compel agencies to develop information about
the expected environmental impacts of their actions and the Court
should accordingly limit the required showing of injury-in-fact
given that statutory purpose, because the agency is supposed to de-
velop that very evidence of injury during its environmental review.
[d. Judge Fletcher recognized that the Court did not engage in this
analysis. /d. at 259.
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Justice Scalia's criticism in Laidlaw that the plaintiffs'
grievance is widely shared and thus generalized because the
plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence of objective harm to the
environment'Fv-eproof for example, that the excess mer-
cury discharged by Laidlaw resulted in the hospitalization
of children or caused dead or injured fish-was beside the
point for the majority; The majority believed that environ-
mental injury for Article ill purposes follows from prop-
erty-rule subjectivity, rather than Justice Scalia's liabil-
ity-rule objectivity. For the Supreme Court and the district
court in Laidlaw, that concern about objective indicia of
harm, of which there was none, was defined by Congress to
be a factor in calculating the amount of the penalty (i.e., the
liability)'?'; it was not determinative of the standing ques-
tion.'?' The Court's analysis of injury-in-fact in Laidlaw is
consistent with the approach that Justice Scalia (ironically)
had presented for the Court in Defenders of WildlifeHJ6
There, in response to Justice Blackmun's complaint that
the Court's narrow limit on the parties that could demon-
strate injury-in-fact would necessitate a very specific de-
scription of actual injury in a loss of consortium case be-
fore standing could be found,"? Justice Scalia had distin-
guished the requisite proof of injury for standing, which
looks to the existence vel non of injury, from the proof of
injury for liability, which depends on the precise extent of
injury and is considered in the damages aspect of the
case. lOS Because Friends of the Earth proved in Laidlaw
that its members were personally affected by the increased
103. See id. at 714, 30 ELR at 20252 (Scalia, r., dissenting):
At the very least, in the present case, one would expect to see
evidence supporting the affidavits' bald assertions regarding
decreasing recreational usage and declining home values, as
well as evidence for the improbable proposition that
Laidlaw's violations, even though harmless to the environ-
ment, are somehow responsible for these effects.
(Citation omitted.)
104. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 701,30 ELR at 20247 ("In deterring the
amount of any civil penalty, the district court must take into account
'the seriousness of the violation or violations, ... '" (quoting 33
U.S.c. §1365(d))); Friends nf the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc .. 956 F. Supp. 588, 602-03, 27 ELR 20976, 20982
(D.S.c. 1997) (evaluating the extent of "demonstrated adverse affect
[sic] on the environment" in determining the amount ofthe civil pen-
alty), rev'd on other grounds, 149 F.3d 303, 28 ELR21444 (4th CiT.
1998), rev' d on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 693, 30 ELR 20246 (2000).
105. Congress' decision to employ a liability rule for determining the
penalty for violations is consistent with the view of Calabresi and
Melamed that such a rule "facilitates a combination of efficiency and
distributive results which would be difficult to achieve under a prop-
erty rule." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1110.
106. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2, 22 ELR at 20916 n.2.
107. See id. at 593, 22 ELR at 20924 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (under
the Court's approach to injury-in-fact, "a Federal Tort Claims Act
plaintiff alleging loss of consortium should make sure to furnish this
Court with a 'description of concrete plans' for her nightly schedule
of attempted activities.").
108. See id. at 564 n.2, 22 ELR at 20916 n.2:
Our insistence upon these established requirements of
standing does not mean that we would, as the dissent con-
tends, "demand ... detailed descriptions" of damages, such
as a "nightly schedule of attempted activities" from plain-
tiffs alleging loss of consortium. That case and the others
posited by the dissent all involve actual harm; the existence
of standing is clear, though the precise extent of harm re-
mains to be determined at trial. Where there is no actual
harm, however, its imminence (though not its precise ex-
tent) must be established.
(Citation omitted.)
pollution levels because of their intended use of the im-
pacted resource, the Court concluded that injury-in-fact
was present under the CWA-proof of its precise extent
was relevant only to the penalty.
This approach of the Laidlaw majority in accepting the
injury to plaintiffs as cognizable under Article illbecause it
is subjectively concrete thus conforms to previous environ-
mental standing decisions of the Court. For the Court, just as
a claimant is injured-in-fact when a forest she uses win have
fewer trees because of the action being challenged as unlaw-
ful, a claimant is injured when a waterway she uses has
higher pollution levels because of NPDES permit viola-
tions. In the former context, the Court has never required the
plaintiff to show either the specific trees that would be re-
moved by the government action or that removal of those
specific trees would objectively impair the area's aesthetics
by, for example, offending a reasonable observer of nature
or reducing the market value of the property. In the permit
violation context, of course, a claimant meeting the proper
party requirements of National Wildlife Federation and De-
fenders of Wildlife is by definition able to demonstrate that
the resource of interest has illegally high pollutant levels;
the Laidlaw Court's decision conformed to its earlier hold-
ings that proof of further harm was not necessary to show in-
jury-in-fact.l'"
In short, the Court's injury-in-fact analysis in Laidlaw is
important for two reasons. First, the Court again decided to
follow Congress' lead by accepting as an injury-in-fact un-
der Article III an effect that is more clearly injurious be-
cause it is a legal violation. As in Akins, the Court did not
hold that Congress had power to define injuries that are cog-
nizable under Article III. I 10 On the other hand, Laidlaw also
did not undermine the CWA regulatory scheme by holding
that, notwithstanding the broadly protective purposes of the
CWA, III a citizen suit claimant is able to bring an action
109. The degree to which the Laidlaw result is bounded in this respect de-
pends on the environmental medium affected by the unlawful pollu-
tion. Other waterways may be less bounded than the waterway at is-
sue in Laidlaw. For example, the court's decision that the plaintiff
demonstrated injury-in-fact in Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp. was based on its view that excessive pollutant lev-
els resulting from the defendant's permit violations affected a "dis-
charge zone" extending 16.5 miles from a lake into which the defen-
dant's effluent flowed. See 204 F.3d 149, 158, 30 ELR 20369, 20373
(4th Cir. 2000). Because the plaintiffs property was well within that
area, the court concluded that the plaintiff suffered injury-in-fact.
See id. When air is the affected medium, the effects are far less
bounded. See infra note 126.
110. The Laidlaw Court thus did not make the argument that the court
seemed to make in Gaston Copper. There, when the Fourth Circuit
explained its conclusion that the plaintiff demonstrated in-
jury-in-fact, the court suggested a willingness to find an Article Ill
injury-in- fact simply on the basis of a statutory violation. See 204
F.3d at 163,30 ELR at 20375:
To deny standing to Shealy here would further thwart con-
gressional intent by recreating the old system of water quality
standards whose failure led to the enactment of the Clean
Water Act in the first place. An important reason for Con-
gress' shift to end-of-pipe standards was to eliminate the
need to address complex questions of environmental abase-
ment and scientific traceability in enforcement proceedings.
(Citation omitted.)
111. One purpose of the CW A is to move toward the zero discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(l), ELR Srxr, FWPCA §101(a)(I) ("[I]t is the national
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated hy 1985.").
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only upon proof that the permit violations are causing water
quality standard violations, or some other objective harm.
Second, because the Court decided to accept the statutory
injury in Laidlaw as cognizable under Article ill and be-
cause the district court made the fact-finding that the statu-
tory violation caused no measurable environmental degra-
dation, the Court had to identify more clearly the lintits of
Article ill injury in this environmental context. The Court
accepted as sufficiently concrete an injury that arises be-
cause of a subjective response to illegally high pollution lev-
els. The Court's acceptance improves our understanding of
the contours of Article ill injury-in-fact, because the case
demonstrates that aggrievement as a result of a statutory vi-
olation is sufficient when it lessens environmental value to
users of the affected resource, even if it is lessened only as a
subjective matter.!"
This conception of injury-in-fact is arguably both nar-
rower and broader than the injury deterntined to be cogniza-
ble inAkins. It is narrower because in Laidlaw the aggrieved
plaintiff had to be a proper party by showing that the subjec-
tive injury resulting from illegally high levels of pollution
actually affected a particular resource used by the plaintiff.
Only those using this resource would have standing to assert
the subjective injury. In contrast, the class of those who
ntight claim an injury due to nondisclosure of information
under Akins does not seem sintilarly constrained: any person
can claim an interest in information the disclosure of which
is required by the statute and Akins accordingly appears
broader than Laidlaw?" Laidlaw, though, is arguably
broader than Akins along a different axis. Laidlaw does not
require any proof of objective, that is measurable, environ-
mental degradation. Laidlaw would thus appear to permit
any person with a proper interest in a resource affected by
pollution levels that are illegally high as a result of defen-
dant's statutory violations to show injury-in-fact as long as
the person feels injured by that higher level of pollution.
This aspect of Laidlaw may be seen as broader than Akins,
because the injury-in-factinAkins was grounded on a depri-
vation of actual information claimed to be important to vot-
ing. Thus, Akins defines a largely unbounded class of per-
sons who would be able to claim injury, while Laidlaw de-
fines actual injury in a way that appears unbounded once a
proper party demonstrates a statutory violation.
Redressability in Citizen Suit Cases
Unlike the injury-in-fact context, where the recent Akins
precedent was available to help the plaintiffs claim for
standing, recent precedent in the redressability context was
112. In some cases, proof of a statutory violation may necessitate proof of
actual harm to the environment. For example, a plaintiff may bring a
citizen suit based on a claim that the defendant's discharge of pollut-
ants has caused a violation of state water quality standards, when
compliance with water quality standards is a condition of the defen-
dant's NPDES permit. For a discussion of the statutory
permissibility of such citizen suits, see Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty
After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement
and theAvailability a/Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393 (1997).
In that circumstance, proof of the statutory violation would be
sufficient for Article III injury without any need to rely on subjec-
tive perceptions.
113. The degree to which the Laidlaw result is bounded in this respect de-
pends on the environmental medium affected by the unlawful pollu-
tion. The air medium is, for example, far less bounded than a river.
See infra note 126.
far less favorable. The Court in Steel Co. had only recently
relied on a lack of redressability to hold that there was no
standing when the plaintiff was complaining about past vio-
lations of an environmental reporting statute.'!" In particu-
lar, the Court had concluded that payment of civil penalties
to the federal fisc would not redress the plaintiffs injury by
giving them psychic satisfaction.!"
Perhaps because the plaintiff in Steel Co. had not claimed
that there was a likelihood of future statutory violations
given the company's prior failures to submit the required re-
ports, the Steel Co. Court never specifically rejected the ar-
gument that civii penalties were sufficient redress due to the
deterrence of future violations. II' The factual context of the
claim inLaidlaw differed significantly from Steel Co. in this
regard. Because of the convergence of the Court's statutory
decision in Gwaltney that a CWA citizen suit is forward
looking with the mootness doctrine, which provides that "a
defendant clainting that its voluntary compliance moots a
case bears the forntidable burden of showing that it is abso-
lutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not rea-
sonably be expected to recur,"!" the Laidlaw plaintiffs had a
live claim based on the violations at the time the claim was
filed unless the defendant met its "formidable burden" of
showing that perntit violations would not recur in the future.
It was in this context of the reasonable threat that future inju-
ries would result from permit violations that the Laidlaw
Court considered whether civil penalties offered sufficient
redress for the plaintiffs.!"
In this context, the Court thought it straightforward
that penalties provide reasonable deterrence against fu-
ture violations and accordingly redress injuries that result
from violations:
It can scarcelybe doubted that, for a plaintiffwho is
injured or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal
114. Steel Co. is discussed supra at notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
1I5. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
116. Justice Scalia disagreed with this reading of Steel Co., and he con-
tended, when dissenting in Laidlaw, that Steel Co. had decided the
redress question. See 504 U.S. at 715, 30 ELR at 20253 ("Only last
Term, we held that such penalties do not redress any injury a citizen
plaintiff has suffered from past violations.").
117. 120 S. Ct. at 709,30 ELR at 20250 (citation omitted). The Court ex-
plained in this regard that "there are circumstances in which the pros-
pect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to
overcome mootness." Id. This greater willingness to permit resolu-
tion of a pending case than to accept a case at the outset reflects in
part the value of judicial efficiency:
Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other
things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts are de-
voted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete
stake. In contrast, by the time moctness is an issue, the case
has been brought and litigated, often (as here) for years. To
abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove more
wasteful than frugal.
[d. at 710, 30 ELR at 20250.
118. This contextual difference was the ground on which the Laidlaw
Court distinguished Steel Co. See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 708,30 ELR
at 20249-50:
In short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Fed-
eral Government, may not sue to assess penalties for wholly
past violations, but our decision in that case did not reach the
issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are on-
going at the time of the complaint and that could continue into
the future if undeterred.
(Footnote omitted.)
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conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that effec-
tively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence
providesa formof redress.Civil penaltiescan fit thatde-
scription. To the extent that they encourage defendants
to discontinue current violations and deter them from
committing future ones, they afford redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a
consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct."?
In addition to relying on the irtherent plausibility of the
deterrent effect of penalties, the Court supported its conclu-
sion of deterrent effect by reference to previous decisions of
the Court. 120 Perhaps more importantly in the context of its
conclusion that Article III standing was present, the Court
twice relied on Congress' own determination that the civil
penalties available under the CWAwould deter future viola-
tions.!" The Laidlaw decision thereby built upon the
Court's approach in Akins and the analysis of injury-in-fact
in Laidlaw itself, which followed Congress' lead in identi-
fying an injury cognizable under Article III, by relying on a
congressional determination of deterrence to find constitu-
tionally adequate redress.!" The Laidlaw Court thus effec-
tively held that, by both providing that civil penalties are
available in the forward-looking CWA citizen suit and find-
ing that civil penalties deter future violations, Congress has
provided at least the peppercorn of redress that the Court
found lacking in Steel CO.!23 Finally, the Court supported Its
119. ld. at 706-07, 30 ELR at 20249.
120. See id. at 706,30 ELR at 20249 ("We have recognized on numerous
occasions that 'all civil penalties have some deterrent effect. I") (cita-
tions omitted).
121. See id. at 707, 30 ELR at 20249:
Congress has found that civil penalties in Clean Water Act
cases do more than promote immediate compliance by limit-
ing the defendant's economic incentive to delay its attain-
ment of permit limits; they also deter future violations. This
congressional determination warrants judicial attention
and respect.
[Ilt is reasonable for Congress to conclude that an actual
award of civil penalties does in fact bring with it a significant
quantum of deterrence over and above what is achieved by
the mere prospect of such penalties. A would-be polluter may
or may not be dissuaded by the existence of a remedy on the
books, but a defendant once hit in its pocketbook will surely
think twice before polluting again.
Id. (footnote omitted).
122. For Justice Scalia in dissent. this extension of the Akins rationale
meant that the Court's improper allowance of injury-in-fact based on
a generalized grievance inAkins was now extended to an unconstitu-
tional recognition of generalized redress.ld. at 716, 30 ELR at 20253
(Scalia. J., dissenting):
Just as a "generalized grievance" that affects the entire citi-
zenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement even
though it aggrieves the plaintiff along with everyone else, so
also a generalized remedy that deters all future unlawful ac-
tivity against all persons cannot satisfy the remediation re-
quirement, even though it deters (among other things) repeti-
tion of this particular unlawful activity against these particu-
lar plaintiffs.
(Citation omitted.)
123. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia was ad-
amant in his view that Congress has no authority under the con-
stitutional structure to make a civil penalty serve the purpose of
the peppercorn:
In seeking to overturn that tradition by giving an individual
plaintiff the power to invoke a public remedy, Congress has
done precisely what we have said it cannot do: convert an
intuitive view that penalties would provide redress by rely-
ing on the fact that the district court had factored the deter-
rent effect of the penalty on Laidlaw when it fixed the proper
amount of Laidlaw's civil penalty.!"
For the Court, therefore, this was the "ordinary case" in
which penalties would be reasonably expected to yield de-
terrence of future violations that would give rise to in-
jury-in-fact to the plaintiff.F'
Conclusion
All told when read in the light of recent standing cases,
Laidlaw is very much a clarification of how that law applies
in the context of likely future violations of statutory stan-
dards intended to protect against pollution of the environ-
ment. The case does not establish new doctrine, but rather
extends the Akins rationale to define a cognizable in-
jury-in-fact to the context of environmental injury. The case
also confmns the Court's property-rule paradigm for identi-
fying environmental injury, so that measurable degradation
in environmental or health quality is not necessary to dem-
onstrate injury-in-fact. Laidlaw' s effect therefore is to focus
claimants in environmental citizen suits on demonstrating
that they are proper parties by showing a real interest in the
resource or environmental amenity being affected by the
"undifferentiated public interest" into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts. The sort of scattershot redress ap-
proved today makes nonsense of our statement in Schlesinger
v, Reservists Comm. to Stop the War that the requirement of
injury in fact "insures the framing of relief no broa~er than
required by the precise facts." A claim of particulanzed fu-
ture injury has today been made the vehicle for pursuing
generalized penalties for past violations, and a ~reshold
showing of injury in fact has become a lever that Will move
the world.
120 S. Ct. at 716-17,30 ELR at 20253 (citations omitted); see also
id. at 717, 30 ELR at 20253 ("[I]t is my view that a plaintiff's desire
to benefit from the deterrent effect of a public penalty for past con-
duct can never suffice to establish a case or controversy of the sort
known to our law.").
124. ld. a1707, 30 ELR at 20249:
Here, the civil penalties sought by FOE carried with them a
deterrent effect that made it likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the penalties would redress FOE's injuries
by abating current violations and preventing future ones-as
the District Court reasonably found when it assessed a pen-
alty of $405,800.
(Citation omitted.)
125. See id.
We recognize that there may be a point at which the detem:nt
effect of a claim for civil penalties becomes so insubstantial
or so remote that it cannot support citizen standing. The fact
that this vanishing point is not easy to ascertain does not de-
tract from the deterrent power of such penalties in the ordi-
nary case.
Justice Scalia ridiculed the idea that the case could be viewed as an
ordinary one for purposes of the value of deterrence for the plaintiff.
ld. at 718, 30 ELR at 20254 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
(I]f this case is, as the Court suggests, within the central core
of "deterrence" standing, it is impossible to imagine what
the "outer limits" could possibly be. The Court's expressed
reluctance to define those "outer limits" serves only to dis-
guise the fact that it has promulgated a revolutionary new
doctrine of standing that will permit the entire body of pub-
lic civil penalties to be handed over to enforcement by pri-
vate interests.
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statutory violation.!" Finally as to the Article III
redressability requirement, Laidlaw wholly marginalizes
126. The limits of the Court's willingness to find injury-in-fact in such
suits may be more likely to he identified in citizen suits under the
Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA
§§101-618, where the affected resource is far lesscabined than a wa-
terway and the permit violations have arguable effects in areas that
are far distant from where the source is located. Regarding the
uncabined nature of air quality impacts. see P. WILLIAMSON&; P.S.
LISS, Understanding the Earth System, in POUCY MAKING IN AN
ERA OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 23 (R.E. Munn,
lW.M. la Riviere & N. van Lookeren Campagne eds., 1996):
In every breath we take there are around 1019 atoms of oxy-
gen; it is therefore a statistical near-certainty that at least one
of these oxygen atoms has been previously breathed by Con-
fucius-and another by Albert Einstein, or anyone else who
lived more than a few decades ago (to allow for worldwide
mixing within the atmosphere).
Cf Battle over Older Coal Plants Widens as States File Their Own
Clean Air Act Suits, 1999 UnL. ENV'T REP. (McGraw-Hili), Dec. 3,
1999, at 1 (describing actions brought by northeastern states claim-
ing violations by midwestern power plants of new source permit re-
Steel Co. by concluding that the civil penalties that Con-
gress provides in citizen suits offer sufficient redress by de-
terring future violations (that must be threatened in any
event to avoid moomessj.!"
quirements based on ozone impacts in the northeastern states). The
SCRAPCoUI1 suggested that there may be pragmatic limits on stand-
ing when an action with an allegedly unlawful environmental impact
has an exceptionally widespread impact, at least when the impact is
"less direct and perceptible:' See United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatnry Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 3
ELR 20536 (1973). Cf Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112
(1992) (upholding EPA interpretation ofCW A regulations requiring
a showing that a source's discharge caused a "detectable change in
water quality" 39 miles downstream before more stringent water
quality-based limitations would be required.
127. The Laidlaw Court thereby limited the effect of Steel Co. to the nar-
row circumstances of a citizen suit based on a wholly past violation.
As a statutory matter, the Court had, of course, previously foreclosed
such actions under the CWA. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 64-65,18 ELR 20142, 20145
(1987).
